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BOOK REVIEW
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION. By George E. Palmer. Boston, Massa-
chusetts, and London, England: Little, Brown and Company.
1978. Pp. xxxv + 2634 in four volumes. Hardbound. $180.00.
Reviewed by Alan W. Scheflin*
Socrates: The judging of law-suits is a duty that you will
lay upon your Rulers, isn't it?
Glaucon: Of course.
Socrates: And the chief aim of their dedication will be
that neither party shall have what belongs to
another or be deprived of what is his own.
Glaucon: Yes.
Socrates: Because it is just?
Glaucon: Yes.
Plato, The Republic
Most legal systems provide procedures by which a person
may recover a loss resulting in the unjust enrichment of an-
other.' Several European countries have enacted into their civil
codes legal principles preventing unjust enrichment, thereby
establishing restitution as an independent cause of action in
appropriate cases.2 The German Civil Code is typical. Section
812 (1) provides:
Whosoever acquires anything through the acts of another,
or in any way at that person's expense, without legal justi-
© 1979 by Alan W. Scheflin.
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1. It is clear that any civilized system of law is bound to provide reme-
dies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit,
that is to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some money
derived from another which is against conscience that he should keep.
Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in
contract or tort, and are now recognized to fall within a third category of
the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.
Fibrosa Spolka Ackyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., [1943J A.C. 32,
61 (Lord Wright). In R. GOFF & G. JONES, THE LAW OF RESTrrUTION 11 (1966), the
learned authors state: "Most mature systems of law have found it necessary to provide,
outside the fields of contract and civil wrongs, for the restoration of benefits on grounds
of unjust enrichment." See also Friedmann, The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in
English Law, 16 CAN. B. REV. 243, 244 (1938), and Holdsworth, Unjustifiable
Enrichment, 55 L.Q. REV. 37 (1939).
2. See Gutteridge & David, The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment, 5
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 204, 209 (1934).
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fication, is bound to restore it to him. Such obligation shall
also arise when the legal justification ceases to exist, or
where the intended purpose of a legal transaction has not
been achieved. 3
In other countries, the principle of preventing unjust en-
richment has been judicially established. In France, for exam-
ple, the judiciary has been actively creating and enlarging a
law of restitution despite the silence of the Civil Code on the
point.4
In light of this development, it would be natural to expect
that the principle of preventing unjust enrichment would be
firmly embedded in American and English law. But such is not
the case. It remains a fact today that "English law has not as
yet recognized any generalized right to restitution in every case
of unjust enrichment."5 Indeed, Professor John Dawson be-
lieves that even the present progress of English law is in need
of re-thinking. Dawson has written:
The English law of Restitution as a whole gives a remarka-
ble example of the effects of freezing doctrine-still more
of freezing minds-in an area still incompletely explored
at the time the freeze sets in.'
3. BURGERLITCHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 812(1) (W. Ger.). See also CODICE
CIVILE [C.C.] art. 2041 (Italy), which is similar to BGB art. 812(1), although limited
in its application by C.C. art. 2042 (Italy) that states: "The application of enrichment
is not available where the person who has suffered the loss can bring another action to
make good the loss he has suffered."
4. The silence is strange in light of the remarks of Pothier:
Dans les contrats, c'est le consentement des parties contractantes qui
produit l'obligation; dans les quasi contrats, il n'intervient aucun con-
sentement, et c'est la loi seule ou i'dquit; naturelle qui produit
l'obligation, en rendant obligatoire le fait d'od elle rdsulte.
2 POTHIER, OEUVRES § 114 (Bugnet ed. 1890). See J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 92-
109 (1951); Gutteridge & David, supra note 2 at 205-22; O'Connell, Unjust
Enrichment, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 2 (1956).
French judges, at least for the last 75 years, have consistently followed the princi-
ple of unjust enrichment and have treated it as on a par with Code provisions. The
classic formula, adopted by the Cour de cassation in 1914, states:
Attendu que l'action de in rem verso, fond6e sur le principle d'6quit6 qui
ddfend de s'enrichir au ddtriment d'autrui doit 6tre admise dans tous
lescas oil, le patrimoine d'une personne se trouvant sans cause lgitime
enrichi aux ddpens de celui d'une autre personne, cette derni~re ne joui-
rait, pour obtenir ce qui lui est dd, d'aucune action naissant d'un contrat,
d'un quasi-contrat, d'un ddlit ou d'un quasi-ddlit.
Id. at 7-8 (citing S. 1918-19.1.41; D.P. 1920. 1.102).
5. R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 1, at 13. See Maudsley, Restitution in
England, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1123 (1966).
6. J. DAWSON, supra note 4, at 21.
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Though not as bleak as English jurisprudence, the Ameri-
can law of restitution is still very much in its infancy. As late
as 1970, a leading American scholar expressed the view that the
American legal system has "split the whole field of civil obliga-
tion into contract obligations and tort obligations." 7 For many
practitioners, Professor Gilmore stated the accepted wisdom.
But it is not the whole truth. With the publication of Professor
George Palmer's four-volume treatise, The Law of Restitution,
this neglected and still unfamiliar area of law may take its
rightful place in the arena of civil duties and liabilities.
The rightful place of restitution was well-stated in 1958 by
Professors Seavey and Scott, the two reporters for the Restate-
ment of Restitution (a document which had the distinct privi-
lege of restating an area of law whose very existence was un-
known to a large segment of the bar and bench):
In this [the American Law Institute] has recognized
the tripartite division of the law into contracts, torts and
restitution, the division being made with reference to the
purposes which each subject serves in protecting one of
three fundamental interests. In this division, the postulate
of the law of contracts (or of undertakings) is that a person
is entitled to receive what another has promised him or
promised for him. . . The interest of the promisee or
beneficiary which is protected by the law is his reasonable
expectation that a promise freely made will be performed.
The law requires the promisor, if he fails to perform the
promise, to place the other, as far as reasonably can be
done, in as good a position as if the promise had been
performed. The law of torts is based upon the premise that
a person has a right not to be harmed by another, either
with respect to his personality or with respect to his inter-
ests in things and in other persons. The law protects this
right by requiring a wrongdoer to give such compensation
to the person harmed as will be substantially equivalent to
the harm done. The accent is upon wrong and harm. Be-
side these two postulates there is a third, sometimes over-
lapping the others, but different in its purpose. This third
postulate, which underlies the rules assembled in the Re-
statement under the heading 'Restitution', can be ex-
pressed thus: A person has a right to have restored to him
a benefit gained at his expense by another, if the retention
of the benefit by the other would be unjust. The law pro-
7. Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 103, 111
(1970), quoted in 1 G. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION at 1 n.1 (1978).
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tects this right by granting restitution of the benefit which
otherwise would, in most cases, unjustly enrich the recipi-
ent.
This was a far cry from the state of the law that prompted
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to write "we are inclined to think
that Torts is not a proper subject for a law book."! I
In one respect, the law of restitution stands today where
Holmes viewed torts in 1871. Before the publication of Palmer's
treatise, few texts on restitution had appeared.'" The earliest
was Professor Keener's Quasi-Contracts, published in 1883. It,
of course, was limited in its scope and did not include much of
what restitution is concerned with today. Thirty years later,
the appearance of Professor Woodward's book, Quasi-
Contracts, helped alert lawyers to this important area of civil
obligation, but it was not until the Restatement of Restitution
was published in 1937 that restitution emerged as a separate
and distinct body of law. Unfortunately, that Restatement has
had little impact on practitioners and judges who still view
restitution as a mysterious and non-specific set of moral gener-
alizations, useful only when more traditional arguments fail.
Although several casebooks on restitution have appeared (one
co-written by Professor Palmer)," none have been revised in
over a decade. 2 The reluctance of law schools to add the course
to their curricula has caused restitution to remain the forgotten
child of common law.
The first legal text treating restitution as a unified, dis-
8. Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 31-32 (1938). Elsewhere, Profes-
sor Seavey has made the point: "Restitution is a term unknown to legal treaties,
encyclopedias and digests, yet it represents one of a trinity of principles which actuate
the proceedings for remedial justice." Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OKLA. L. REV.
257 (1954).
9. R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 5, at 5 n.8 (citing a book review by Holmes
that appeared at 5 AM. L. REV. 340-41 (1871)). Three years later, Holmes had a change
of mind; see M. HOWE, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, THE PROVING YEARS 1870-1882 AT 65, 184
(1963).
10. See Wade, The Literature of the Law of Restitution, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1087
(1968).
11. J. DAWSON & G. PALMER, RESTITUTION (1958); E. THURSTON, CASES ON
RESTITUTION (1940); J. WADE, RESTITUTION (1958).
12. Professor Wade's casebook was revised for a second and final edition in 1966.
The Dawson & Palmer casebook was revised in 1969 for a second and final edition.
Special mention should be made of two symposia on restitution: A Symposium on
Restitution, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1019 (1966); and Symposium: Restitution, 19 HASTINGS
L.J. 993 (1968). Restitution as a separate law school subject now faces extinction in
light of the proliferation of remedies courses.
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tinct body of law appeared in England in 1966.11 Written by
Professors Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, it was unique if only
for the fact that at the time of its appearance, English law was
not willing to concede that a systematic law of restitution even
existed. Indeed, Professor Jones told me in conversation shortly
after his book was published that some law libraries in Britain
were not ordering it for precisely that reason. 4 Shades of
Holmes!
There is evidence that the long-ignored and grossly under-
appreciated area of restitution may soon start receiving the
attention it deserves. Writing specifically to assist practitioners
in making use of restitutionary relief, Professor Graham Douth-
waite published an Attorney's Guide to Restitution in 1977.1"
This book, focusing on problems of procedure and proof and
providing specific illustrations, was intended to be, and serves
admirably as, a handy desk reference. For attorneys who seek
a more academic presentation, and for members of the bench
who need reinforcement that restitution is a legitimate and
cohesive set of doctrinal principles, Professor Palmer's treatise
is invaluable.
Palmer has done more than write about restitution-he
has lived with it and creatively shaped it. For many years he
has labored in its fields and his prior writings have been influ-
ential in developing several modern restitutionary concepts. In
addition, many students of the subject, including myself, have
been weaned on his casebook, fashioning our first acquaintance
with this fascinating subject from its pages. Those of us who
knew there was much more to be said can now be gratified that
Palmer has said it, and said it well.
As the table of contents of Palmer's treatise demonstrates,
the student of the law of restitution must be a jack-of-all-
trades. Volume I begins with an historical examination of such
central concepts as quasi-contract, the constructive trust, sub-
rogation, and various equitable remedies. In chapter 2, Palmer
addresses tort problems, infringement of copyrights, patents,
trademark protection and the arcane but enchanting legal fic-
tions necessary to solve tracing problems when money is com-
mingled and later transferred or converted into other assets.
13. R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 1.
14. For contemporary verification of this attitude, see Orakpo v. Manson Invest-
ment Ltd., (1977) 3 ALL E.R. 1, 7.
15. G. DOUTHWAITE, ATrORNEY'S GUIDE TO RESTITUTION (1977).
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The tort emphasis is continued into the next chapter which
focuses on fraud and misrepresentation issues. Volume I closes
with an introductory examination of the relationship between
contract and restitution.
Volume II begins with contract issues (unenforceable, frus-
trated and illegal contracts), continues with non-contractual
concepts (duress, unsolicited benefits) and concludes with two
chapters on mistake, an inquiry that takes up the entire next
volume and a portion of the fourth volume as well. This last
volume concludes with chapters on gifts, testamentary disposi-
tions and three-party transactions. Few branches of the law
escape mention, for the law of restitution requires the eclecti-
cism of a Renaissance man. Because restitution is more often
than not called upon when traditional branches of the law seem
inadequte to do justice between the parties, eclecticism must
be combined with the wisdom and judgment of a Solomon. It
is this rare mixture of talents Palmer demonstrates in his trea-
tise.
It is beyond the scope of this review to examine various
substantive points for minor disagreements, sustained objec-
tions, or even wholesome praise. Rather, I much prefer to sug-
gest that my overall perception is that Palmer's work is careful,
balanced and well-presented. I found his writing to be clear and
devoid of the irritating minutiae and convoluted embellish-
ments that too often pass for scholarship in legal journals.
There is a careful deliberation about Palmer's writing that I
find appealing. Perhaps it is the many years of teaching that
suggests the patient point-by-point, one-step-at-a-time ap-
proach. Or perhaps it is the natural logical orderliness of his
mind that enables Palmer to state directly and simply the
point he is making. Whatever the reason, his writing makes
reading his work an enjoyable experience.
My delight with Palmer's treatise should not be taken as
an indication of total agreement with its present format. Al-
though substantive disagreements are usually just matters of
personal taste, I believe there are two serious procedural flaws
that may hinder the accessibility of Palmer's work.
A large share of confusion and ambiguity surrounding the
law of restitution may be generated by the fact that there are
essentially three distinct senses of "restitution" to be found in
legal writing."6 The first uses "restitution" to mean a measure
16. See generally Note, Restitution: Concept and Terms, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1167
(1968).
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of recovery for violation of a traditional obligation already rec-
ognized by law. For example, where defendant breaches a con-
tract duty, plaintiff might ask that damages be awarded not by
the expectancy interest (the difference between what was
promised and what was received), nor by the reliance interest
(the out-of-pocket losses), but rather by the measure of the
extent to which the defendant has enriched himself at the ex-
pense of the plaintiff. Thus, the restitutionary interest in con-
tract is a measure of recovery for a breach of a traditional
contract duty."
The second sense in which "restitution" appears in the
literature is as a remedial technique or procedure for tradi-
tional violations of civil obligations. In the law of torts, for
example, instead of measuring damages to compensate what
the plaintiff has lost, a specific remedy to disgorge defendant's
ill-gotten gains might better suit the ends of justice. Use of
such restitutionary remedies as the constructive trust and the
equitable lien in traditional tort cases brings greater creativity
and flexibility to time-honored and well-recognized causes of
action. 8
In each of the above two senses, "restitution" functions in
a remedial capacity. In the first, it provides a formula for as-
sessing monetary damages, while in the second, it provides a
process to reach assets in the hands of the defendant that more
rightfully belong to the plaintiff. In both of these cases, how-
ever, plaintiff must find a traditional cause of action to plead.
There is a third sense of "restitution", however, which
recognizes that the very existence of an unjust gain in the
hands of the defendant is a sufficient motivating factor to allow
the courts to permit plaintiff to entertain an action against the
defendant. Restitution as a cause of action is a quantum leap
from restitution in a remedial sense. For most of the history of
Anglo-American law, it was not the case that "for every wrong
there is a remedy" despite language to that effect in many
judicial opinions." The fit between right and remedy is a seam-
stress's nightmare and the vast amount of judicial tailoring to
the common law has made the garment in many cases even
more unseemly. But there has been steady progress and the
17. See Henderson, Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrich-
ment and the Law of Contracts, 57 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1115 (1971).
18. See York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 499 (1957).
19. See Note, A Remedy for All Injuries?, 25 Cm. L. REV. 90 (1946).
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movement from restitution as a remedy to restitution as a right
is more than an historical quirk of legal machinations; it por-
tends an alternative jurisprudential approach to the role of law
in resolving social disputes.
My criticism of Palmer is that by failing adequately to
separate the three senses of "restitution" he not only makes
understanding the cases and their evolution into legal princi-
ples more difficult, but, of much more significance, he fails to
show the pivotal position of restitution as a philosophy of social
relations and not merely one small branch of the vast legal
system.
My second procedural criticism of Professor Palmer's trea-
tise is addressed to its organization. While I believe that any-
one who succeeds in ordering restitution into a coherent and
logical structure is a fit candidate for the Pulitzer Prize, I think
there are many ways to organize the material that will assist
substantive analysis of it. Professor Palmer's treatise is without
an overt analytical structure and it so announces itself by hav-
ing no division other than numbered chapters.
There is obviously some natural order to any written work
and Professor Palmer seems to be following one based upon
how the defendant acquired the benefit now claimed to be
unjustly held by him.20 But if such is the case, some explicit
discussion of that organizational scheme would seem vital.
Students of restitution have the greatest difficulty understand-
ing the subject as a whole and it is essential that a table of
contents provide an analytical structure to the material. There
is always a reason for presenting ideas in a certain order. In the
area of restitution, that order, if cogent, will materially aid
substantive understanding.
Professor Palmer's Law of Restitution is the product of a
lifetime's work. It conveys a depth that comes only from famil-
iarity and a breadth that suggests great tolerance and equan-
imity. It is bound to be a positive influence on the growth and
quality of restitution; we shall all be the beneficiaries.
20. See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 7, at 40-44.
1148 [Vol. 19
